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“CARVING AT THE JOINTS”: USING ISSUE CLASSES 
TO REFRAME CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS 
Jenna C. Smith 
Abstract: Achieving class certification in consumer litigation is a highly controversial 
and greatly debated area of civil procedure. Historically, certification under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) has been difficult to achieve due to the tension between the 
presence of individual issues and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance, superiority, and 
management considerations. The future of certification for Rule 23(b)(3) classes was further 
put in question with the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes in 2011, which enhanced the level of scrutiny courts apply at the Rule 23(a) level of 
analysis. The Court’s 2013 decisions in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend and Amgen v. Connecticut 
Retirement Plan and Trust Fund further highlight the difficulties Rule 23(b)(3) classes face 
in achieving certification. Despite these developments, there are signs of continued vitality. 
In 2012, the Seventh Circuit allowed issue class certification in a large employment 
discrimination class, notwithstanding the presence of individual issues in McReynolds v. 
Merrill Lynch. McReynolds placed Rule 23(c)(4) (a historically seldom used subsection of 
Rule 23) in the spotlight as a means of allowing consumer claims to achieve certification in 
the post-Dukes era. This Comment explores the use of issue class certification under Rule 
23(c)(4) and attempts to clarify when issue class certification is appropriate, with a particular 
focus on consumer class actions. By breaking complex issues into smaller, more manageable 
pieces, Rule 23(c)(4) allows litigants to frame common issues for class treatment and avoid 
an unnecessarily rigorous analysis of the merits of a claim at the certification stage. 
INTRODUCTION 
The efficacy of using class actions to pursue mass consumer claims is 
the subject of much controversy and great uncertainty.1 Courts are 
frequently reluctant to certify mass consumer classes because of the 
tension between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the prevalence 
of individual issues.2 The future of mass-consumer class actions was 
further called into question in the landmark decision, Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes,3 in which the United States Supreme Court set forth a 
1. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the 
Intersection between Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 71 (noting 
that the class action has become the focal point of much political and legal debate); see also John 
Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular 
Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249 (discussing generally the difficulty 
consumer class actions face at the certification stage). 
2. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594 (1997).  
3. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
1187 
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more stringent test for satisfying Rule 23(a)’s commonality 
requirement.4 As one commentator noted, Dukes “raises more questions 
than it answers.”5 
In light of the heightened standard for achieving certification post-
Dukes, the use of issue classes under Rule 23(c)(4) is an increasingly 
attractive option for litigants.6 Rule 23(c)(4) allows a court to divide 
litigation into smaller pieces, a process often referred to as bifurcation.7 
Most commonly, courts employ bifurcation first to decide the issue of 
liability, followed by determinations of individual damages in follow-on 
proceedings.8 While bifurcation of a case between liability and damages 
is the most common use of Rule 23(c)(4) and the focus of most legal 
scholarship on the issue, “there is no rule that if a trial is bifurcated, it 
must be bifurcated between liability and damages.”9 Increasingly, the 
debate among courts has shifted to the use of Rule 23(c)(4) to isolate a 
threshold issue for class treatment—even if class members’ suits might 
ultimately need to be adjudicated individually—as long as the resolution 
of the class issue will substantially advance the disposition of the 
litigation as a whole.10 
The reinvigoration of Rule 23(c)(4) is in tension not only with 
traditional perceptions of Rule 23 classes but also with specific 
provisions of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b). This textual tension, combined 
with the relative paucity of case law interpreting Rule 23(c)(4), has 
resulted in a three-way circuit split.11 The majority of circuits, including 
the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth, interpret Rule 23(c)(4) 
expansively, and will certify an issue class even if the claim as a whole 
4. Id. at 2551. 
5. James Comodeca & Gabrielle Hils, CAFA, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, And Other Key Developments 
In Class Action Litigation, ASPATORE, Nov. 2011, at *1, *10, available at 2011 WL 5617994. 
6. Jennifer Brooks-Crozier, Put Up Your Dukes: The Fight Over Commonality in the Era of Wal-
Mart v. Dukes, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 711, 731 (2013) (discussing the rise of hybrid class 
actions post-Dukes).  
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4); Romberg, supra note 1, at 262–63. 
8. 2 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:2 (9th ed. 2012); see also 
RICHARD NAGAREDA, THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION 251 
(2009); see also, e.g., Hill v. W. Elec. Co., 672 F.2d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[B]ifurcation of 
Title VII class action proceedings for hearings on liability and damages is now commonplace.”).  
9. Hydrite Chem. Co. v. Calumet Lubricants Co., 47 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1995).  
10. 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1790, at 588–
90 (3d ed. 2005).  
11. See, e.g., Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 200 n.25 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The 
interaction between the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) and (b) and the 
authorization of issue classes under Rule 23(c)(4) is a difficult matter that has generated divergent 
interpretations among the courts.”). 
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does not satisfy Rule 23.12 The Fifth Circuit rejects this construction of 
Rule 23(c)(4) and instead maintains that courts may certify an issue class 
only if the claim as a whole merits class-wide treatment.13 The Third 
Circuit follows a slightly different approach, and applies a multi-factor 
balancing test to determine whether Rule 23(c)(4) issue classes should 
be certified.14 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.15 is perhaps the most high-profile case to 
endorse a liberal use of Rule 23(c)(4) post-Dukes.16 In McReynolds, 700 
African-American employees sued Merrill Lynch, alleging that two 
specific company policies had a disparate impact on racial minorities.17 
While the individual nature of damage determinations would likely have 
prevented the class from satisfying Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
requirement, the Seventh Circuit approved the use of Rule 23(c)(4) to 
certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2) only on the issue of liability.18 
Writing for the court, Judge Posner found that the greatest efficiency and 
fairness would be achieved by “carving at the joints” of the parties’ 
dispute and resolving the issue of liability on a class-wide basis.19 While 
some courts and commentators view McReynolds as a direct 
contradiction of Dukes,20 others view it as a straightforward application 
12. See In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (“courts may use 
subsection (c)(4) to single out issues for class treatment” even when the cause of action as a whole 
could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(3)); see also Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 
1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying certification of class in Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability 
Litigation based on failure to satisfy Rule 23(a)’s typicality and adequacy requirements, but 
clarifying that there was no absolute bar for issue certification in products liability cases). 
13. In the Fifth Circuit, “a cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement 
of (b)(3)”; plaintiffs “cannot manufacture predominance through the nimble use of subdivision 
(c)(4).” Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996). 
14. See Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting the American 
Law Institute’s factors to determine when issue class certification is warranted).  
15. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012), 
cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 488. Initially, the district court denied certification. Id. at 484. However, in light of the 
groundbreaking nature of Dukes, the Seventh Circuit surprisingly allowed interlocutory appeal from 
the district court’s order denying employee’s amended motion. Id. at 488. 
18. Id. at 492. 
19. Id. at 491 (quoting Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Systems Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 2003)).  
20. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14–21, McReynolds, 133 S. Ct. 338 (No. 12-113), 2012 WL 
3041173, at *14–21; see also Bolden v. Walsh Const. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 897–98 (7th Cir. 2012). In 
Bolden, the court held that district court misinterpreted the McReynolds court’s discussion of Dukes: 
Our opinion remarked that the class in Wal-Mart would not have been manageable, but we did 
not suggest that this was the basis of the Court’s decision; we just observed that the class 
certified there had problems in addition to Rule 23(a)(2), and that company-wide suits that do 
 
                                                     
 
14 - Smith Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013  5:27 PM 
1190 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1187 
of Rule 23(c)(4)21 and a practical model for future consumer class 
actions to follow.22 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in McReynolds, 
thereby leaving the boundaries of Rule 23(c)(4) unsettled.23 
In light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, Rule 23(c)(4) is 
increasingly relevant as a way to avoid a more searching inquiry into the 
merits of a case at the certification stage.24 In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut 
Retirement Plans & Trust Funds25 the Court suggested that it would not 
continue to endorse a more exacting inquiry into the merits of a case 
beyond what the text of Rule 23 requires.26 However, just a month later, 
in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,27 the Court relied heavily on Dukes in 
determining that plaintiffs must show that damages are capable of 
measurement on a class-wide basis in order to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance requirement.28 Consequently, it is unclear whether Dukes 
should be viewed as the high-water mark of hostility toward class 
certification, or whether the Court will continue to ratchet up class 
certification requirements. 
Despite recent hostility toward certification of large consumer classes, 
for many types of consumer cases, the class action is the only 
appropriate mechanism for relief.29 Especially where consumers have 
incurred relatively minor harm or damages, filing individual litigation is 
neither economically feasible nor an efficient use of judicial resources.30 
present common issues therefore may be certified (if they are manageable, as Wal-Mart would 
not have been.).  
Id. 
21. See, e.g., DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120, 127 (2013) (“The putative class in 
McReynolds was appropriate post-Wal-Mart because the economic harm alleged by each class 
member was the result of the same corporate-wide policies and if the policies were held unlawful 
then a question central to the validity of each class member’s claim would be resolved in one 
stroke.”). 
22. While McReynolds involved employment discrimination claims and class certification under 
Rule 23(b)(2), this Comment argues that this approach is one of the best paths toward certification 
for consumer litigation, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 class action decisions.  
23. See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012).  
24. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __U.S__, 133 S. Ct. 1436, 1436–37 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (discussing generally the proposition that Rule 23(c)(4) is increasingly relevant in the 
wake of heightened certification requirements).   
25. __U.S __, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
26. Id. at 1202. 
27. Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1426.  
28. Id. at 1433–34. 
29. William Schwarzer, Structuring Multiclaim Litigation: Should Rule 23 Be Revised?, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 1250, 1253 (1996). 
30. Romberg, supra note 1, at 258.  
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Additionally, class actions promote several important public policies. By 
aggregating claims into a single lawsuit, class actions avoid duplicative 
litigation and prevent inconsistent results—thereby promoting judicial 
economy and maximizing efficiency.31 Class actions provide social 
utility by allowing an aggregation of private individuals to enforce laws, 
where the cost of litigation and relatively minor amount of recovery 
might prevent the claims from moving forward on an individual basis.32 
Additionally, if a class action is successful at the certification stage, the 
threat of bearing the cost of the harm causes many defendants to settle 
immediately, which can have powerful deterrent effects.33 
This Comment explores the viability of issue class certification under 
Rule 23(c)(4) as a means of achieving certification in consumer 
litigation. Part I of this Comment explains the requirements for 
achieving certification under Rule 23. Part II highlights the importance 
of achieving a uniform interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4) in the wake of 
expanded federal jurisdiction over class actions. Part III discusses how 
recent Supreme Court decisions will impact the way courts interpret 
Rule 23. Part IV discusses the viability of issue class certification in the 
wake of Dukes, with a particular focus on the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
in McReynolds. Part V argues that other circuits should adopt the 
expansive interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4) that is in favor in the majority 
of federal circuits. Part VI discusses the limitations of issue class 
certification and provides guidance as to when issue class certification 
might not be appropriate. 
I.  TO ACHIEVE CERTIFICATION, A PUTATIVE CLASS MUST 
SATISFY RULE 23(A)’S FOUR PREREQUISITES, AS WELL 
AS ONE SUBCATEGORY OF RULE 23(B) 
The class action mechanism is an important procedural device that 
allows courts to resolve common claims impacting many individuals in a 
single action.34 Rule 23 establishes the requirements for certification of a 
federal class action.35 In order to achieve certification, which is required 
before class-action litigation can commence, a class must first meet the 
31. Rachel Tallon Pickens, Too Many Riches? Dukes v. Wal-Mart and the Efficacy of Monolithic 
Class Actions, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 71, 73 (2006). 
32. Id. at 73–74; see also Redish, supra note 1, at 87 (noting that “private class actions for money 
damages can yield significant social benefits”).  
33. Pickens, supra note 31, at 74.  
34. GEOFFREY HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE § 833 (10th ed. 2011). 
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  
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four requirements of Rule 23(a) and must also meet the separate (though 
overlapping) requirement for any one of Rule 23(b)’s subsections.36 The 
four Rule 23(a) prerequisites are numerosity,37 commonality,38 
typicality,39 and adequacy of representation.40 Prior to Dukes, most 
courts interpreted Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites liberally.41 The rationale 
behind this approach was that the merits of a potential class are more 
accurately discerned at the Rule 23(b) level of analysis.42 As the next 
section of this Comment will discuss, Dukes shifted the heart of class-
certification analysis to Rule 23(a), by ratcheting up the commonality 
requirement to require a more searching analysis of the uniformity of the 
legal or factual issues of the class.43 
In addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a), a class must 
also satisfy the requirements of one of Rule 23(b)’s subsections to 
36. Id. 23(a); Id. 23(b).  
37. To satisfy numerosity, the class must be “so numerous that joinder of all of the members is 
impracticable.” Id. 23(a)(1); accord Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, 726 F.2d 136, 145 (4th Cir. 
1984). There is no minimum number of class members required, nor is a strict mathematical test 
required to satisfy numerosity. Brady, 726 F.2d at 145. Numerosity depends on the facts and 
circumstances of each case. Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 448 
(N.D. Cal. 1994).  
38. Commonality requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(a)(2). Prior to Dukes, the commonality requirement had not been applied rigorously, and was 
“not demanding.” See Comodeca & Hils, supra note 5, at *3 (Prior to Dukes, “[m]ost practitioners 
defending class actions spent little time challenging the ‘commonality’ requirement under Rule 
23(a), instead focusing more on the ‘predominance’ criteria set out in Rule 23(b).”); Mullen v. 
Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 
F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the requirement of commonality is “minimal”). 
39. Typicality requires that the claims of the named plaintiff be typical of the claims of the class 
as a whole. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). The typicality requirement has historically not been rigorous in 
application, and the claims of the class representatives need not be identical to the class as a whole, 
as long as a “class members need to advance legal theories that are similar, if not identical to those 
advanced by named plaintiffs.” Lightbourn v. Cnty. of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 1997); 
accord Paxton v. Union Nat’l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 561 (8th Cir. 1982) (“The rule does not require 
that every question of law or fact be common to every member of the class.”). 
40. Adequacy of representation requires that class representatives “fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). In contrast to the more liberal application of the 
other factors, courts typically apply greater scrutiny as to whether the adequacy of representation 
requirement is satisfied. See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
1183, 1186–91 (1982). Any evidence of a conflict of interest or potential conflict of interest among 
the class representatives and class as a whole will prevent Rule 23(a)(4) from being satisfied. 
Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of Chi., 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993). 
41. Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 156, 159 (S.D. W. Va. 1996); Kidwell v. Transp. 
Commc’ns Int’l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 305 (4th Cir. 1991).  
42. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997). 
43. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545 (2011).  
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achieve certification.44 Rule 23(b) provides four ways to maintain a class 
action.45 For the purposes of this Comment, the most important 
subsections of Rule 23(b) are Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3), which are 
the two paths most commonly used in consumer cases.46 Rule 23(b)(2) 
allows a court to grant injunctive relief where “the party opposing the 
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the 
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 
appropriate.”47 As Part II of this Comment discusses further, Dukes 
dramatically changed the way Rule 23(b)(2) can be used and limits this 
category to claims for declarative or injunctive relief.48 
The last category, Rule 23(b)(3), allows litigants to seek monetary 
damages where “questions of law or fact common to the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,” and 
where a class action “is superior to other available methods for fairly and 
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”49 Additionally, the court must 
also consider “the likely difficulties in managing the class action.”50 
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement poses particular challenges 
for large consumer classes seeking certification.51 Recently, courts have 
rigorously enforced the requirement that common issues of law and fact 
“predominate” over individual issues.52 This has been fatal for 
certification of many consumer cases, in which courts have held that the 
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).  
45. Id. The first category, Rule 23(b)(1)(A), is for situations where separate actions would create 
a risk of “inconsistent or varying adjudications.” Id. 23(b)(1)(A). The second category, Rule 
23(b)(1)(B), is satisfied where “adjudications with respect to individual class members” would be 
“dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or 
would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.” Id. 23(b)(1)(B). 
46. See Romberg, supra note 1, at 259 n.42. 
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).  
48. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2545.  
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). To aid in this inquiry, Rule 23(b)(3) provides the following four 
factors for the court to consider: “(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of the separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning 
the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of 
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in 
managing a class action.” Id.  
50. Id. 23(b)(3)(D). 
51. See Romberg, supra note 1, at 261 (“Rule 23(b)(3) therefore imposes two specific 
requirements not applicable to (b)(1) or (b)(2) . . . . It is on the shoals of predominance and 
superiority that most class actions founder.”). 
52. Jenna G. Farleigh, Splitting the Baby: Standardizing Issue Class Certification, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. 1585, 1598 (2011); see also Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433–34 
(2013) (denying certification because plaintiff’s economic model failed to show that damages were 
measurable on a class-wide basis).  
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individual nature of damages precludes a finding that common issues 
predominate over individual issues.53 
Mass tort and consumer class actions present unique challenges for 
determining whether class certification is appropriate.54 The Supreme 
Court has not ruled out the use of class actions in these contexts but 
acknowledges the difficulty in adopting bright line rules to govern 
certification analysis.55 As the Court noted in Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor,56 “[i]n the decades since the 1966 revision of Rule 23, class-
action practice has become ever more ‘adventuresome’ as a means of 
coping with claims too numerous to secure their ‘just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination’ one by one.”57 In Amchem, the Court 
rejected certification of a settlement-only class, based on the fact that the 
class did not meet the adequacy and predominance requirements of Rule 
23.58 The Court further noted that while the Advisory Committee for 
Rule 23 advised that mass accident cases are ordinarily not appropriate 
for class treatment, “the text of the Rule does not categorically exclude 
mass tort cases from class certification.”59 The Court concluded that “the 
Committee’s warning, however, continues to call for caution when 
individual stakes are high and disparities among class members are 
great.”60 Amchem continues to be highly influential and has severely 
limited the availability of Rule 23(b)(3) certification for consumer 
classes.61 
53. See Romberg, supra note 1, at 261; see also Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1433–34. 
54. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 34, at 837 n.2. 
55. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618–19 (1997). 
56. Id.  
57. Id. at 617–18. 
58. Id. at 624.  
59. Id. at 625.  
60. Id.  
61. See, e.g., Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003). In Gunnells, 
the court explained: 
However, as the Supreme Court has noted, the predominance and superiority requirements in 
Rule 23(b)(3) do not foreclose the possibility of mass tort class actions, but merely ensure that 
class certification in such cases “achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and 
promote . . . uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing 
procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.” 
Id. (quoting Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 615). 
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II.  EXPANSION IN FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER CLASS 
ACTIONS HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED FOR UNIFORM 
INTERPRETATION OF RULE 23 
The need to achieve uniform interpretation of Rule 23 is further 
compounded by recent expansion in federal jurisdiction over class 
actions, as well as an amendment to Rule 23 allowing for immediate 
appeal of class certification decisions. As will be discussed in greater 
detail below, the expansion of federal jurisdiction over class actions, 
easier removal to federal court, and interlocutory review of certification 
decisions encourage forum shopping and highlight the need to achieve a 
more uniform interpretation of Rule 23.62 
The enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)63 
significantly changed class-action practice and has further heightened 
concerns about judicial efficiency surrounding class actions in federal 
courts.64 CAFA expanded federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction by (1) 
allowing removal beyond the traditional one-year limit, (2) allowing 
removal by a defendant who is a citizen of the state where the suit was 
initiated, (3) allowing a defendant to remove without first obtaining the 
consent of other co-defendants, and (4) exempting litigants from the 
complete diversity requirement so long as the aggregate amount in 
controversy exceeds $5 million.65 In addition to CAFA, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.66 
expanded traditional diversity jurisdiction over class actions by requiring 
only one plaintiff to meet the $75,000 amount in controversy 
requirement.67 CAFA’s general removal provisions may cause plaintiffs 
who fear removal to federal court to forego bringing an action in state 
court, choosing instead to litigate in federal jurisdictions with more 
generous approaches to certification.68 CAFA’s removal provisions 
make it easier for litigants to forum shop, thereby exacerbating the 
circuit split between the Fifth Circuit and “friendlier” circuits, such as 
the Second, Seventh, and Ninth, and could lead to an inundation of class 
62. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1590. 
63. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2006)). 
64. Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1590. 
65. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b). 
66. 545 U.S. 546 (2005).  
67. Id.  
68. Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1590.  
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certification requests in those circuits.69 
Additionally, Rule 23(f) was modified in 1998 to provide for 
interlocutory review of class-certification decisions.70 The text of the 
rule gives courts of appeals great latitude to grant or deny review of 
certification orders, and courts have developed several different tests to 
determine when interlocutory review is important.71 The advisory 
committee notes cite the various “concerns” associated with class-action 
jurisprudence as justification for “expansion of present opportunities to 
appeal.”72 The ability of litigants to seek interlocutory review of class 
certification decisions and the difficulty courts have encountered in 
determining when review is appropriate, create further incentives to 
achieve uniform interpretation of Rule 23 to reduce the burden of 
certification review in federal courts.73 
III.  RECENT SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE LEAVES THE 
FUTURE OF CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS UNSETTLED 
As discussed in Part I of this Comment, prior to Dukes, courts had 
largely interpreted Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites liberally and did not apply 
a more exacting inquiry above and beyond what the text of the rule 
required.74 Dukes was a landmark departure from this approach and 
greatly enhanced the level of scrutiny applied at the Rule 23(a) 
analysis.75 To many, Dukes signaled the death of mass-consumer class 
actions.76 However, the Court’s 2013 decisions in Amgen and Comcast 
Corp. reflect differing approaches to class-certification analysis that 
69. Id.  
70. Lori Irish Bauman, Class Certification and Interlocutory Review: Rule 23(f) in the Courts, 9 
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 205, 207 (2007).  
71. Id. at 208.  
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note (1998).  
73. Id. 23(f); Bauman, supra note 70, at 208 (discussing how the Advisory Committee “straddled 
the fence” by recognizing the lack of uniformity and high stakes in class certification decisions 
while also attempting to protect judicial efficiency by preventing unnecessary appeals). 
74. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95 (2013) 
(discussing how Dukes firmly established that the Rule 23(a) prerequisites would be analyzed 
“rigorously,” but cautioning that rigorous analysis does not authorize “free-ranging merits inquiries 
at the certification stage”). 
75. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
76. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: Dukes v. Wal-
Mart and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 77 (2011) 
(discussing the impact of Dukes: “[t]he larger concern is that big companies know that it will be 
much harder to sue them in class actions, and the unscrupulous ones will more often make the 
choice to enrich themselves at the expense of consumers and employees”). 
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courts must now reconcile.77 These decisions, discussed in greater detail 
below, highlight the uncertainty surrounding certification of mass 
consumer classes and make a compelling case for the increased use of 
issue class certification pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4).78 
A.  The Landmark Decision: Wal-Mart v. Dukes Heightens the 
Commonality Requirement 
In 2011, the Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart v. Dukes.79 Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, denied class certification for 1.5 million 
female Wal-Mart employees who alleged gender-based employment 
discrimination under Title VII.80 The plaintiffs sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief, punitive damages, and back pay under Rule 23(b)(2). 
Although this was an employment discrimination case, the ruling has 
important and far-reaching consequences for all class actions because 
the Court’s determinations apply to all applications of Rule 23, 
regardless of the underlying cause of action.81 
Prior to Dukes, most lawyers pursuing or defending class-action 
claims for damages focused not on contesting Rule 23(a)’s commonality 
requirement, but instead on whether common issues predominated.82 
Dukes, however, focused on commonality, and the Court ultimately 
determined that the 1.5 million Wal-Mart employees did not satisfy this 
requirement.83 The text of Rule 23(a)(2) provides that “[o]ne or more 
members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on 
behalf of all members only if . . . there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class.”84 The Court interpreted this provision to also 
require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members “have 
suffered the same injury.”85 The Court noted that class members cannot 
77. See Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 10-4188, 2013 WL 3746205, at *25–26 (6th Cir. July 18, 
2013) (discussing the impact of Amgen and Comcast Corp. on Rule 23(b)’s predominance 
requirement). 
78. See Linda S. Mullenix, Class Action Cacophony at the Supreme Court, 35 NAT’L L. J. 28 
(2013) (discussing how the Court’s decisions in Amgen and Comcast Corp. reflect the Court’s 
liberal and conservative divide, but broke no new ground regarding black-letter class certification 
doctrines).  
79. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.  
80. Id. at 2541. 
81. See Comodeca & Hils, supra note 5, at *3. 
82. Id.  
83. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
85. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
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prove the same injury has been suffered by showing “merely that they 
have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law,” which prior 
to this decision, had been sufficient to satisfy commonality.86 
The Court held that to satisfy commonality, the claims must depend 
on a common contention—namely, the assertion of discriminatory bias 
on the part of the same supervisor—rather than varied examples of 
potentially discretionary decisions by managers at various levels of 
hierarchy in the Wal-Mart corporation.87 The Court articulated a new 
test for the “commonality” requirement: 
That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature 
that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that 
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is 
central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.88 
The Court asserted that the inquiry at the certification stage should 
focus not on asking common questions, but instead, on the ability of 
common answers to fairly resolve the litigation for the class as a 
whole.89 
The Court further articulated that Rule 23(b)(2) is meant only to 
address those indivisible harms that apply evenly to all members of the 
class.90 Consequently, the Court determined that Rule 23(b)(2) does not 
authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled 
to an individualized award of monetary damages.91 This meant that had 
the class survived certification, it would only have been entitled to an 
award of injunctive or declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and money 
damages incidental to that injury, such as attorney’s fees. To obtain 
monetary damages, the plaintiffs would have to seek additional 
certification under Rule 23(b)(3). However, the Court suggested that 
such an attempt would be fruitless, as the individual nature of the 
plaintiffs’ injuries would surely fail Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
inquiry.92 
Immediately following Dukes, courts saw a flood of motions for 
decertification.93 While it is clear that Dukes heightened the 
86. Id. 
87. Id.  
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 2557.  
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 2559.  
93. See Brooks-Crozier, supra note 6, at 718 (discussing courts’ struggle to make sense of 
Dukes).  
 
                                                     
14 - Smith Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013  5:27 PM 
2013] REFRAMING CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS 1199 
commonality requirement,94 recent certification decisions95 validate 
Justice Ginsburg’s concern that the new commonality standard “mimics 
the Rule 23(b)(3) inquiry into whether common questions ‘predominate’ 
over individual issues.”96 According to Justice Ginsburg, Dukes’ impact 
is problematic for two reasons: first, when courts focus on uncovering 
dissimilarities among the class at the Rule 23(a)(2) stage, “no mission 
remains for Rule 23(b)(3)”;97 and second, applying what was effectively 
the predominance requirement from Rule 23(b)(3) at the 23(a)(2) stage 
imposes additional requirements on Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) 
classes above and beyond what Rule 23’s framers intended.98 
Additionally, Dukes pushes any claims for monetary relief into the realm 
of Rule 23(b)(3).99 The combined effects of Dukes have made it 
increasingly difficult for consumer class actions to achieve certification 
under the traditional approach, thereby making the use of bifurcation to 
achieve certification on certain issues more appealing and necessary than 
ever before. 
B.  Amgen: Retrenching from Dukes 
For class-action plaintiffs, the Court’s 2013 decision in Amgen100 was 
a welcome departure from Dukes. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the six 
justice majority, which also included Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices 
Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan.101 Amgen involved a claim for 
securities fraud, with the Court holding that plaintiffs invoking the 
“fraud-on-the-market” presumption of reliance need not establish the 
element of materiality to obtain certification in a federal-securities class 
action.102 The Court’s analysis focused on whether Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance requirement was satisfied: 
Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that questions common to the 
class predominate, not that those questions will be answered, on 
94. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194 (2013) 
(discussing how Dukes heightened the requirements for certification). 
95. See Brooks-Crozier, supra note 6, at 719 (“Courts’ certification decisions since Dukes bear 
out Justice Ginsburg’s argument.”).  
96. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 2565–66. 
99. Id. at 2557 (majority opinion) (holding that classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2) may seek 
only injunctive relief and incidental money damages). 
100. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195 (2013). 
101. Id. at 1190. 
102. Id. at 1195–96.  
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the merits, in favor of the class. Because materiality is judged 
according to an objective standard, the materiality of [the 
company]’s alleged misrepresentations and omissions is a 
question common to all members of the class [the retirement 
plan] would represent. The alleged misrepresentations and 
omissions, whether material or immaterial, would be so equally 
for all investors composing the class. As vital, the plaintiff 
class’s inability to prove materiality would not result in 
individual questions predominating. Instead, a failure of proof 
on the issue of materiality would end the case, given that 
materiality is an essential element of the class members’ 
securities-fraud claims. As to materiality, therefore, the class is 
entirely cohesive: It will prevail or fail in unison. In no event 
will the individual circumstances of particular class members 
bear on the inquiry.103 
Although Amgen’s holding is limited to securities-fraud class actions 
involving the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption, the Court’s reasoning 
suggests that the Court will not continue to ratchet up certification 
requirements beyond what the text of Rule 23 requires. Amgen can be 
read to put the brakes on Dukes: while Dukes held that the plaintiffs 
must raise issues that are common to the entire class,104 Amgen held that 
as long as common questions are asked, they need not be answered at the 
certification stage.105 The majority articulated that distinction in the 
following way: “Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-
ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage. Merits questions may 
be considered to the extent—but only the extent—that they are relevant 
to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification 
are satisfied.”106 
The dissent, written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Scalia 
and Kennedy, asserted that the plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing 
all of the elements of their case at the certification stage, including the 
element of materiality. 
Without demonstrating materiality at certification, plaintiffs 
cannot establish Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption. 
Without proof of fraud on the market, plaintiffs cannot show 
that otherwise individualized questions of reliance will 
predominate, as required by Rule 23(b)(3). And without 
103. Id. at 1191.  
104. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
105. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1195.  
106. Id. at 1194–95. 
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satisfying Rule 23(b)(3), class certification is improper.107 
The victory for plaintiffs seeking certification was short-lived because 
the Supreme Court soon revisited the question of how intensely courts 
would consider the merits of a case at the certification stage in Comcast 
Corp.108 
C.  Comcast Corp. Further Unsettles the Future of Mass Consumer 
Claims 
A few weeks after Amgen, the issue of looking beyond the pleadings 
at the certification stage reappeared in Comcast Corp.109 Justice Scalia 
wrote for the majority, which included the Chief Justice, and Justices 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.110 In Comcast Corp., the Court reversed 
the Third Circuit’s decision to certify a class in an antitrust action where 
the class failed to show that damages could be calculated on a class-wide 
basis through a common methodology.111 Drawing heavily upon Dukes, 
the Court held that the regression model developed by the plaintiffs’ 
expert was not acceptable as proof that damages were susceptible to 
measurement on a class-wide basis, and emphasized that proving class-
wide damages was essential to satisfying the predominance criteria of 
Rule 23(b)(3).112 The Court faulted the Third Circuit for refusing to 
“entertain arguments against respondents’ damages model that bore on 
the propriety of class certification simply because they would also be 
pertinent to the merits determination” to consider the evidence of how 
damages would be calculated.113 The Court reasoned that in some 
circumstances, “the Court may have to probe behind the pleadings 
before coming to rest on the certification question.”114 
The dissent, written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, cautioned that Comcast Corp. should 
have been dismissed as improvidently granted.115 Justice Ginsburg 
107. Id. at 1206 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
108. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1434 (2013). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id.  
112. Id.  
113. Id. at 1432–33.  
114. Id. at 1432 (internal quotations omitted). 
115. Id. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Court granted review to address the question of 
“[w]hether a district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has 
introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to 
awarding damages on a class-wide basis.” Id. at 1431 n.4 (majority opinion). In response, the parties 
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further argued that the Comcast Corp. decision failed to break any new 
ground in class-action jurisprudence, as it “remains the ‘black letter rule’ 
that a class may obtain certification under Rule 23(b)(3) when liability 
questions common to the class predominate over damages questions 
unique to class members.”116 Justice Ginsburg explained that Rule 23 
does not require “commonality as to all questions,” but rather, “when 
adjudication of questions of liability common to the class will achieve 
economies of time and expense, the predominance standard is generally 
satisfied even if damages are not provable in the aggregate.”117 Quoting 
the Advisory Committee’s 1966 Note on Rule 23, Justice Ginsburg 
explicitly highlighted the continued vitality of issue class certification: 
[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar 
misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class 
action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is 
found, for separate determination of the damages suffered by 
individuals within the class.118 
While the ideological split among the Justices makes it difficult to 
predict future trends impacting class certification, these recent decisions 
highlight the importance of carving out common issues for class 
certification.119 As both Comcast Corp. and Amgen illustrate, the Court 
will not hesitate to transform issues involving the merits of a claim into a 
Rule 23(b) predominance analysis.120 Therefore, using Rule 23(c)(4) to 
carve out issues that more easily satisfy Rule 23’s prerequisites enables 
litigants to avoid a more searching inquiry into the merits of a claim at 
the certification stage. 
devoted much of their briefing to the issue of whether the standards governing the admissibility of 
expert testimony set forth by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), apply in certification proceedings. See generally Brief 
for Petitioner, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (No. 11-864), 2012 WL 
3613365; Brief for Respondent, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (No. 
11-864), 2011 WL 9153773. The Court eventually realized, however, that Comcast failed to 
preserve the issue of admissibility of expert testimony for review. Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 
1436–37. 
116. Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1437 (quoting 2 W. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 4:54, at 205 (5th ed. 2012)) (“ordinarily, ‘individual damage[s] calculations should not 
scuttle class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)’” (quoting RUBENSTEIN, supra)). 
117. Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1437.  
118. Id. (quoting 7AA CHARLES ALLAN ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1781, at 
235–37 (3d ed. 2005)).  
119. See Mullenix, supra note 78, at 2 (“The Amgen and Comcast Corp. decisions are nonetheless 
striking for their similar embrace of fundamental class certification principles, relying on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes . . . .”). 
120. Id. (“Ironically, in Amgen and Comcast Corp., Ginsburg and Scalia performed the same 
sleight-of-hand trick, transforming the ‘merits’ problem into a Rule 23(b)(3) analysis.”).  
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IV.  THE USE OF RULE 23(C)(4) TO ALLOW CERTIFICATION 
WITH RESPECT TO DISCRETE ISSUES IS HIGHLY 
CONTROVERSIAL AND HAS GENERATED A CIRCUIT 
SPLIT 
Bifurcation is a tool that courts may use to break a single lawsuit into 
separate issues.121 Rule 42(b) allows district courts broad discretion to 
bifurcate a single lawsuit into separate trials if bifurcation will promote 
efficiency, judicial economy, or avoid prejudice.122 Rule 23(c)(4) 
specifically allows bifurcation in class actions.123 The Rule provides that 
“when appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class 
action with respect to particular issues.”124 This allows litigants to seek 
certification with respect to certain issues, while allowing other issues to 
proceed on an individual basis.125 The most commonly used type of 
bifurcation in class action litigation is bifurcation on the issue of a 
defendant’s liability.126 If liability is established, damages will then be 
determined in individual proceedings.127 If the plaintiffs do not prevail 
on the issue of liability, the litigation ends.128 In a bifurcated class 
action, absent class members are typically obligated to “opt in” to 
resolve all remaining individual issues.129 Bifurcation, both in the class 
action context and litigation more generally, has become a relatively 
common means of managing complex lawsuits.130 Generally, the term 
“bifurcation” applies where “common and individual issues for all class 
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
122. Id.; Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1596. 
123. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1596. Bifurcation pursuant to Rule 42(a) differs from issue 
class certification in three primary ways: bifurcation results in only one judgment, it applies in non-
class-action lawsuits, and it may utilize a single jury. Id. Additionally, bifurcation generally only 
separates liability and damages determinations, whereas issue certification can divide litigation in a 
multitude of ways. Id. 
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
125. See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 483 (7th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012) (allowing certification only on the issue of 
liability, while leaving the question of certification for a damages class for a later proceeding). 
126. Romberg, supra note 1, at 266. 
127. Id. 
128. Id.  
129. Id.  
130. Id. at 263; see also Stephen S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705, 722 
(2000) (“The clear consensus is that bifurcation offers huge potential trial savings in multi-plaintiff, 
complex litigation because the resolution of a common issue can eliminate the need for hundreds or 
thousands of separate trials to resolve individual issues.”). 
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members . . . are resolved in multiple stages of the same lawsuit.”131 As 
one commentator described it, bifurcation allows “the court to cut up a 
huge meal into bite-sized chunks.”132 
Increasingly, litigants have sought certification of “partial class 
actions” or “hybrid class actions” in which the court certifies only the 
common issues in the case for collective resolution.133 While this often 
involves certification on the issue of liability, a key distinction is that in 
a partial class action, after the common issues are resolved, the suit ends 
for absent class members.134 Absent class members never directly 
participate in the class lawsuit itself; rather, after the common issue has 
been tried, they may file their own individual actions, relying on the 
preclusive effect of the resolution of the common issue.135 Another key 
distinction between a bifurcated class action and a “partial class action” 
is that bifurcation implies a two-step division of a case between the issue 
of liability and damages, whereas a partial class action may involve a 
number of different divisions and need not be limited to the division of 
liability and damages.136 This Comment addresses the certification 
challenges faced by both bifurcated and partial class actions. 
Rule 23(c)(4) was adopted along with other major amendments to 
Rule 23 in 1966. However, until the late 1980s, courts and practitioners 
largely ignored Rule 23(c)(4), instead choosing to decide certification 
based on the litigation as a whole.137 As the requirements for traditional 
certification have been heightened, litigants are increasingly turning to 
Rule 23(c)(4) issue class certification.138 Currently, appellate and district 
courts are struggling with the boundaries of issue class certification, and 
there is a three-way circuit split regarding the proper interpretation of 
Rule 23(c)(4)’s language.139 
131. Romberg, supra note 1, at 266.  
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 266–67. 
134. Id. at 266. 
135. Id. at 266–67; see also Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives 
and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 691, 706–09 (2006) (discussing 
the differences in bifurcated class actions and hybrid class actions in greater depth). 
136. See Sherman, supra note 134, at 706–07. 
137. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1595. 
138. Brooks-Crozier, supra note 6, at 731 (discussing courts’ treatment of 23(c)(4) post-Dukes); 
Laura J. Hines, The Dangerous Allure of the Issue Class Action, 79 IND. L.J. 567, 582 (2004) 
(discussing the paucity of decisions involving Rule 23(c)(4) pre-Dukes). 
139. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1623. 
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A. The Fifth Circuit Rejects the Use of Rule 23(c)(4) if the Claim as a 
Whole Does Not Satisfy Rule 23 
In the Fifth Circuit, “a cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the 
predominance requirement of (b)(3).”140 Castano v. American Tobacco 
Co.141 acknowledged that Rule 23(c)(4) can be used in some 
circumstances to overcome discrete differences among the class or 
discrete issues that share a more common nucleus of operative fact; 
however, the court cautioned that: 
Severing the defendants’ conduct from reliance under [R]ule 
23(c)(4) does not save the class action. A district court cannot 
manufacture predominance through the nimble use of 
subdivision (c)(4). The proper interpretation of the interaction 
between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that . . . (c)(4) is a 
housekeeping rule that allows courts to sever the common issues 
for a class trial.142 
The court noted that reading Rule 23(c)(4) to allow a court to sever 
issues until the “remaining common issue predominates over the 
remaining individual issues would eviscerate the predominance 
requirement of [R]ule 23(b)(3); the result would be automatic 
certification in every case where there is a common issue, a result that 
could not have been intended.”143 
Some commentators endorse the Fifth Circuit’s view, and describe 
Rule 23(c)(4) as “merely a ‘housekeeping tool,’ not a mechanism to 
circumvent other Rule 23 requirements.”144 In support of this position, 
scholars cite Rule 23(c)(4)’s placement in subdivision (c) of Rule 23 as 
reflecting a “managerial rather than a primary role for (c)(4)(A).”145 
Additionally, they note that “[n]one of the other subdivision (c) 
provisions alter the terms under which a (b) class action may be 
140. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting certification 
of a class of millions of persons and their family members who had incurred illness or died from 
using tobacco products; the widespread variability in the amount of exposure, type of tobacco use, 
and types and degree of disease were fatal to the plaintiffs’ request).  
141. Id. 
142. Id.  
143. Id.  
144. Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709, 711 
(2003); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal 
Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039, 1059 (1986) (discussing that partial certification for mass tort 
cases is never appropriate because these cases cannot meet Rule 23(a)’s requirements).  
145. Hines, supra note 144, at 719 (noting that other provisions in subdivision (c) include notice 
for (b)(3) class actions, timing of class certification, division of subclasses, and binding nature of 
class action judgments). 
 
                                                     
14 - Smith Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013  5:27 PM 
1206 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1187 
certified, or provide independent authority to certify an alternative type 
of class action.”146 They argue that if Rule 23(c)(4) was intended to 
authorize a fourth path for class certification, it would not be contained 
within subsection (c), but would occupy a more prominent place within 
Rule 23.147 Some scholars suggest that recent appellate decisions show 
that issue class certification is falling out of favor in the courts.148 Others 
counter, and this author agrees, that these decisions reflect case-specific 
concerns such as choice-of-law and Seventh Amendment concerns, 
rather than a general opposition to the issue class mechanism.149 
B.  Most Circuits Allow Bifurcation Under Rule 23(c)(4) to Certify 
Issue Classes, Even Where the Claim as a Whole Does Not Satisfy 
Rule 23 
The majority of circuits support a more liberal approach to issue class 
certification. The First,150 Second,151 Fourth,152 Sixth,153 Seventh,154 
Ninth,155 Tenth,156 and Eleventh157 Circuits allow the use of Rule 
146. Id.  
147. Hines, supra note 137, at 586–87. 
148. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Daniel Wolf, Class Certification: Trends and Developments Over the 
Last Five Years (2004-2009), in 13TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CLASS ACTIONS F-20, F-
108-F-109, 1 at 104–09, (A.B.A. ed., 2009). 
149. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1601. 
150. Tardiff v. Knox Cnty., 365 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding predominance was not defeated 
merely by the need for individualized damage decisions where there were still disputed common 
issues as to liability).  
151. In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 226–27 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that 
district court exceeded its discretion by failing to certify a class on the issue of liability pursuant to 
Rules 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4)(A)). 
152. Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 441 (4th Cir. 2003) (affirming conditional 
certification of some claims and decertifying on other claims where reliance and the need for 
individual inquiry precluded a finding of predominance).  
153. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming 
certification on issue of liability where cause of groundwater pollution was a single course of 
conduct that was identical to all plaintiffs, but cautioning that not all claims of property damage or 
exposure are alike). 
154. Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming certification 
of issue class on issue of liability and extent of contamination, but leaving damages to be tried 
individually). 
155. Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Even if the common 
questions do not predominate over the individual questions so that class certification of the entire 
action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to isolate the common 
issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class treatment of these particular issues.”). 
156. Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. XTO Energy, Inc., No. 12-3776, 2013 WL 
3389469, at *5 (10th Cir. July 9, 2013) (discussing the availability of 23(c)(4) to isolate common 
issues, but vacating and remanding the certification order because plaintiffs failed to show that 
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23(c)(4) to single out certain issues for class treatment, even if the cause 
of action as a whole does not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3). 
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit is an influential voice on 
class actions and has emerged as one of the leading proponents of issue 
class certification.158 Judge Posner’s approach to bifurcation is perhaps 
best exemplified in Mejdrech v. Met Coil Systems Corp:159 
[C]lass action treatment is appropriate and is permitted by Rule 
23 when the judicial economy from consolidation of separate 
claims outweighs any concern with possible inaccuracies from 
their being lumped together in a single proceeding for decision 
by a single judge or jury. Often, and as it seems to us here, these 
competing considerations can be reconciled in a “mass tort” case 
by carving at the joints of the parties’ dispute. If there are 
genuinely common issues, issues identical across all the 
claimants, issues moreover the accuracy of the resolution of 
which is unlikely to be enhanced by repeated proceedings, then 
it makes good sense, especially when the class is so large, to 
resolve those issues in one fell swoop while leaving the 
remaining, claimant-specific issues to individual follow-on 
proceedings.160 
1.  McReynolds Represents the Best Path Forward for Consumer 
Class Actions 
In 2012, one year after Dukes, the Seventh Circuit issued a highly 
anticipated decision in McReynolds.161 While Dukes signaled the 
Supreme Court’s hesitancy to allow clever tactics to avoid compliance 
with Rule 23, the Seventh Circuit used Rule 23(c)(4) to carve the 
plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims into common issues that were 
consistent with Dukes’ heightened commonality requirement.162 
In McReynolds, 700 African-American Merrill Lynch employees 
damages were measurable on a class-wide basis); see also Fulghum v. Embarq Corp., No. 07–2602–
EFM, 2011 WL 13615, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 4, 2011); Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 167 
F.R.D. 178, 184–85 (D. Kan. 1996) (district courts within the Tenth Circuit applying Rule 23(c)(4) 
where claim as a whole did not satisfy predominance).  
157. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus. Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 2009) (remanding 
case for determination of whether common issues predominated over individual issues and whether 
hybrid class for injunctive relief was appropriate). 
158. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 34, at 839. 
159. 319 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2003). 
160. Id. at 911 (emphasis added). 
161. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012). 
162. Id. at 484. 
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alleged that two Merrill Lynch operating policies had a disparate impact 
on African-American brokers.163 Under the company’s “teaming 
policy,” brokers in the same office had the option of forming teams for 
the purpose of sharing clients and gaining access to additional clients.164 
The second policy challenged was the “account distribution” policy, 
which allowed brokers to compete for the clients of departing brokers.165 
The plaintiffs sought certification for two purposes.166 They first sought 
certification for injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2), alleging that 
Merrill Lynch engaged in practices that had a disparate impact on the 
700 African-American potential class members.167 Although the class 
members intended to seek compensatory and punitive damages under 
Rule 23(b)(3), they did not seek certification of the Rule 23(b)(3) class 
at the same time as the Rule 23(b)(2) class.168 Consequently, the court’s 
ruling focused only on whether the requirements for certification under 
Rule 23(b)(2) had been met—the putative class did not have to 
overcome Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority hurdles.169 
The court distinguished the McReynolds plaintiffs’ claims from those 
in Dukes based on the fact that the McReynolds plaintiffs challenged two 
specific company policies that had an allegedly discriminatory impact.170 
By contrast, in Dukes, the plaintiffs did not allege that any top-down 
corporate policy was responsible for their injuries.171 As the court 
articulated: 
But in a disparate impact case the presence or absence of 
discriminatory intent is irrelevant; and permitting brokers to 
form their own teams and prescribing criteria for account 
distributions that favor the already successful—those who may 
owe their success to having been invited to join a successful or 
promising team—are practices of Merrill Lynch, rather than 
practices that local managers can choose or not at their whim. 
Therefore challenging those practices in a class action is not 
forbidden by the Wal-Mart decision; rather that decision helps 
(as the district judge sensed) to show on which side of the line 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 488. 
165. Id. at 488–89.  
166. Id. at 483. 
167. Id. at 483, 488. 
168. Id. at 483. 
169. Id. at 488. 
170. Id.  
171. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
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that separates a company-wide practice from an exercise of 
discretion by local managers this case falls.172 
The court found that the “incremental causal effect . . . of those 
company-wide-policies—which is the alleged disparate impact—could 
be most efficiently determined on a class-wide basis.”173 Thus, the court 
concluded that granting certification on the issue of injunctive relief 
under Rule 23(b)(2) was appropriate.174 Once the issue of liability was 
decided in the Rule 23(b)(2) class proceeding, the plaintiffs would have 
to seek certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class, or litigate the 
issue of damages individually.175 
The court explained that the propriety of bifurcation under Rule 
23(c)(4) depends on the circumstances of each individual case.176 While 
the court acknowledged that the issues of compensatory damages and 
predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) might be difficult to achieve on a 
class-wide basis, those issues were not before the court, and the 
relatively high amount of damages sought would justify allowing 
individual proceedings.177 Ultimately, the court determined that partial 
class certification was warranted because liability would “most 
efficiently be determined on a class-wide basis, rather than in 700 
individual lawsuits.”178 
In dicta, the court provided guidance as to when partial certification 
under Rule 23(c)(4) is appropriate. The court cautioned that 
consolidating the issue of liability into one class proceeding might not be 
appropriate “if enormous consequences ride on that resolution.”179 In 
some cases, there is a more obvious danger “that resolving an issue 
common to hundreds of different claimants in a single proceeding may 
make too much turn on the decision of a single, fallible judge or jury.”180 
The court warned that the alternative might prove equally dangerous, 
with the risk that common issues could be decided in hundreds of 
different proceedings, burdening the judicial system and resulting in 
very disparate outcomes.181 Balancing these factors in McReynolds, the 
172. McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 490.  
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 491. 
176. Id.  
177. Id.  
178. Id. at 483. 
179. Id. at 491; see also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002). 
180. McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 491.  
181. Id.  
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court felt that these dangers were best remedied by having separate trials 
on pecuniary relief, rather than denying certification of all issues.182 
The court also noted that the amount of damages at issue and the 
complexity in proving those damages should be considered when 
evaluating the viability of bifurcation.183 In McReynolds, the damages 
sustained would be relatively easy to prove and were large enough to 
justify individual suits.184 Where no glaring difficulties in conducting 
individual suits for damages were apparent, the court had “trouble seeing 
the downside of the limited class action treatment” and reversed the 
district court’s denial of class certification under Rules 23(b)(2) and 
23(c)(4).185 After Merrill Lynch’s appeal to the Supreme Court was 
denied, the parties reached a settlement in August 2013 in which Merrill 
Lynch agreed to pay $160 million—the largest settlement in U.S. history 
for a racial discrimination case against an American employer.186 
The McReynolds decision is a high-profile interpretation of the 
heightened class certification requirements established in Dukes, and 
further exacerbates the conflicting application of Rule 23(c)(4) among 
circuit courts. Litigants will likely flock to circuits that follow the 
Seventh Circuit’s approach. Rather than read McReynolds as a sweeping 
endorsement of issue class certification, litigants should take note of the 
practical framing of the issues, particular issues of law involved, and 
relative simplicity with which individual damages could be calculated as 
important factors that tipped the scales in favor of allowing issue class 
certification. 
C.  The Third Circuit Applies a Balancing Test to Determine when 
Bifurcation Is Appropriate 
After acknowledging the conflict among other circuits, in 2011, the 
Third Circuit applied the factors set forth in the American Legal 
Institute’s (ALI) Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation187 to 
determine when certification of an issue class is appropriate.188 The 
Third Circuit instructed courts to consider: 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 492.  
185. Id. 
186. Patrick McGeehan, Merrill Lynch in Big Payout for Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2013, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/merrill-lynch-in-big-payout-for-bias-case/. 
187. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 2.02–2.05, 2.07–2.08 
(2010). 
188. See Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 273 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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[T]he type of claim(s) and issue(s) in question; the overall 
complexity of the case; the efficiencies to be gained by granting 
partial certification in light of realistic procedural alternatives; 
the substantive law underlying the claim(s), including any 
choice-of-law questions it may present and whether the 
substantive law separates the common issue(s) from other issues 
concerning liability or remedy; the impact partial certification 
will have on the constitutional and statutory rights of both the 
class members and the defendant(s); the potential preclusive 
effect or lack thereof that resolution of the proposed issue class 
will have; the repercussions certification of an issue(s) class will 
have on the effectiveness and fairness of resolution of remaining 
issues; the impact individual proceedings may have upon one 
another, including whether remedies are indivisible such that 
granting or not granting relief to any claimant as a practical 
matter determines the claims of others; and the kind of evidence 
presented on the remaining issues, including the risk subsequent 
triers of fact will need to reexamine evidence and findings from 
resolution of the common issue(s).189 
These considerations are not exhaustive, and should be used to guide 
courts as they apply Rule 23(c)(4) to “treat common things in common 
and to distinguish the distinguishable.”190 
As the next section of this Comment discusses, although the ALI 
factors are rarely mentioned in decisions, they provide helpful guidance 
as to when issue class certification is appropriate.191 Many of these 
factors have been considered by courts in other jurisdictions, and can 
help courts balance the interests of efficiency and judicial economy with 
the black letter requirements of Rule 23.192 The Third Circuit’s approach 
is consistent with that adopted in the majority of federal circuits and 
provides a clearer methodology for determining when common issues 
are severable from individual issues. 
189. Id. 
190. Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 267 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 
400 F.2d 28, 35 (5th Cir. 1968)). 
191. Id.; Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Civ. No. 08-6197 (DRD), 2013 WL 1694451, at *4 
(D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2013) (court considered ALI factors and determined that issue of liability was not 
separable from individual damages). 
192. See, e.g., Wallace v. Powell, No. 3:09–cv–286, 2013 WL 2042369, at *10 (M.D. Pa. May 
14, 2013) (court applied ALI factors to determine that certification of liability was wholly separable 
from individual issues).  
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V.  RULE 23(C)(4) IS AN IMPORTANT TOOL THAT SHOULD BE 
USED MORE OFTEN TO OVERCOME CHALLENGES TO 
CERTIFICATION IN CONSUMER CASES 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in McReynolds,193 thereby 
leaving the boundaries of Rule 23(c)(4) unsettled.194 While the use of 
Rule 23(c)(4) to bifurcate a class action on the issue of liability and 
damages is widely accepted,195 its use to certify issue classes in “partial 
class actions” or “hybrid class actions” is the subject of much debate.196 
In the wake of Dukes, issue class certification is an increasingly 
attractive option for litigants in complex consumer cases. Under the right 
circumstances, Rule 23(c)(4) can be used to certify an issue class so that 
common issues and remaining individual issues are resolved in a manner 
that is both fair to the parties and efficient for the judicial system.197 
A. The Plain Language of Rule 23(c)(4) and Structure of Rule 23 
Support an Expansive Interpretation of Issue Classes 
The plain language of Rule 23 and accompanying advisory committee 
notes support a more expansive interpretation of issue class certification. 
Rule 23(c)(4) currently provides as follows: “When appropriate, an 
action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to 
193. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012), 
cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012). In the petition for certiorari, Merrill Lynch framed 
the issues for review as follows: 
(1) Whether the Seventh Circuit’s certification of a disparate impact injunction [in 
McReynolds] conflicts with the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, which 
rejected certification of a nationwide class that, like [the class in McReynolds], asserted 
disparate impact claims based on employment policies requiring the exercise of managerial 
discretion[; and] (2) [w]hether the Seventh Circuit erred in holding, in conflict with other 
circuits, that Rule 23(c)(4) permits class certification of a discrete sub-issue when the claim as 
a whole does not satisfy Rule 23(b) and hundreds of individual trials would be needed to 
determine liability. 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McReynolds, 
__U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012) (No. 12-113), 2012 WL 3041173, at *i. 
194. The Supreme Court’s only decision specifically addressing Rule 23(c)(4) held that a court 
has no obligation to utilize Rule 23(c)(4) sua sponte. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 
388, 408 (1980).  
195. See Romberg, supra note 1, at 263. 
196. Id. at 267. See also Timothy Congrove et al., Uncertain Principles? Evaluating the Tension 
Between Rule 23(b)(3) And (c)(4) Post-Dukes, and the ALI’s Effort to Integrate the Provisions, 13 
CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 741, 742 (2012). (“Courts have struggled with how the availability of 
the Rule 23(c)(4) issue class effects the certification process, especially with respect to the 
requirement that common questions predominate over questions affecting only individual 
members.”). 
197. See Romberg, supra note 1, at 265.  
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particular issues.”198 Originally, issue class certification was authorized 
by Rule 23(c)(4)(A), and subclasses were authorized by Rule 
23(c)(4)(B).199 However, in 2007 Rule 23 was amended and the issue 
class provision was relabeled Rule 23(c)(4) and subclass provision 
became Rule 23(c)(5).200 The Advisory Committee described the 2007 
amendments as “part of a general restyling of the Civil Rules to make 
them more easily understood and to make style and terminology 
consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only.”201 
Prior to the 2007 amendments to Rule 23, however, a stronger 
argument existed that Rule 23(c)(4) could be invoked without first 
satisfying predominance.202 The earlier version of Rule 23(c)(4) read, 
“[w]hen appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a 
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be 
divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the 
provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied 
accordingly.”203 Both the Second Circuit and Fourth Circuit drew 
heavily on this textual analysis in determining that Rule 23(c)(4) could 
be invoked without first satisfying predominance.204 
As the court in Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc.205 articulated, 
the Fifth Circuit’s approach is illogical because it renders Rule 23(c)(4) 
superfluous.206 Under the Fifth Circuit’s view, “a court considering the 
manageability of a class action—a requirement for predominance under 
Rule 23(b)(3)(D)—to pretend that subsection (c)(4)—a provision 
specifically included to make a class action more manageable—does not 
exist until after the manageability determination [has been] made.”207 
Under this view, a court would only consider Rule 23(c)(4) as a tool “to 
198. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (emphasis added).  
199. Id. 
200. Id. 23 advisory committee’s note (2007). 
201. Id.  
202. See Congrove et al., supra note 196, at 744. 
203. FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (pre-2007 amendments).  
204. See In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2006); see also 
Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 439 (4th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that the rule’s 
language is an “express command” that “courts have no discretion to ignore”). 
205. Gunnells, 348 F.3d 417. 
206. See id. at 439 (discussing the dissent’s view that the claim as a whole must satisfy Rule 
23(b)(3)’s requirement); see also Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d at 226–27 (discussing 
and adopting the Fourth Circuit’s Reasoning in Gunnells).  
207. Gunnells, 348 F.3d at 439 (discussing dissent’s view that claim as a whole must satisfy Rule 
23(b)(3) requirements).  
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manage cases that the court had already determined would be 
manageable without using Rule 23(c)(4).”208 
One commentator argues that the 2007 amendments nullify the 
textual analysis relied on by the Second and Fourth Circuits and suggests 
that consistent with the reason for the 2007 amendments, “Rule 
23(c)(4)’s former structure was similarly nothing more than a matter of 
style.”209 However, the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 included many 
substantive changes to the rule, including the creation of 23(b)(3) 
classes,210 thus any inference that the prior structure of Rule 23(c)(4) 
was merely stylistic is unsupported. 
In fact, a closer look at the 1966 advisory committee notes supports 
the interpretation that Rule 23(c)(4) can be invoked prior to showing 
predominance. The notes provide, “[i]n a fraud or similar case the action 
may retain its ‘class’ character only through the adjudication of liability 
to the class; the members of the class may thereafter be required to come 
in individually and prove the amounts of their respective claims.”211 
Thus, the Advisory Committee specifically intended for Rule 23(c)(4) to 
be used to carve out the common issues for class treatment even if the 
claim as a whole would not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
requirement. 
Finally, commentators note that records of the Advisory Committee’s 
proceedings reflect that the committee intended for Rule 23(c)(4) to be 
interpreted broadly, evinced by the rejection of language that would 
have narrowed the scope of the rule.212 As originally drafted, the rule 
read: “[W]hen appropriate . . . an action may be brought or maintained 
as a class action only with respect to particular issues such as the issue of 
liability.”213 The final Rule, however, rejected the narrowing 
language.214 A plausible interpretation of the reason for this change is 
208. Id. (emphasis in original).  
209. See Congrove et al., supra note 196, at 744 (“[A]ny implication that assessing predominance 
comes after the certification of an issue class is wholly absent from the current formulation of Rule 
23(c)(4).”). 
210. See FED R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966).  
211. Id. 23(c)(4) advisory committee’s note (1966).  
212. Hannah Stott-Bumsted, Severance Packages: Judicial Use of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(c)(4)(A), 91 GEO. L.J. 219, 222 (2002). But see Laura J. Hines, The Unruly Class 
Action, __GEO. W. L. REV.__ (forthcoming (2013) (arguing that the private correspondence of 
Professor Charles Allen Wright, in which Wright described Rule 23(c)(4) as a “picky detail” 
suggests that the Advisory Committee did not intend for Rule 23(c)(4) to play a prominent role).    
213. AMENDMENTS: PRELIMINARY DRAFT (Feb.–Mar. 1964), RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, 1935–1988, 
microformed on CIS No. CI-7104-53 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
214. Stott-Bumsted, supra note 212, at 224. 
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that the committee envisioned Rule 23(c)(4) to be used beyond situations 
of severing liability and damages, in support of a more liberal use of 
issue class certification.215 
B.  The Use of Issue Classes Promotes the Goals Rule 23’s Drafters 
Intended to Advance 
The more expansive interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4) is consistent with 
the overall purpose of Rule 23. The class-action mechanism was 
designed to conserve “the resources of both the courts and the parties by 
permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member] to be 
litigated in an economical fashion.”216 As the Supreme Court stated in 
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty:217 
[t]he justifications that led to the development of the class action 
include the protection of the defendant from inconsistent 
obligations, the protection of the interests of absentees, the 
provision of a convenient and economical means for disposing 
of similar lawsuits, and the facilitation of the spreading of 
litigation costs among numerous litigants with similar claims.218 
In Amchem, Justice Ginsburg described Rule 23(b)(3) as “the most 
adventuresome innovation”219 in Rule 23: “framed for situations in 
which ‘class-action treatment is not as clearly called for’ as it is in Rule 
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) situations, Rule 23(b)(3) permits certification where 
class suit ‘may nevertheless be convenient and desirable.’”220 Because it 
was drafted the same year as the current Rule 23(b)(3), it is plausible 
that Rule 23(c)(4) was drafted to advance the same public policy goals 
as Rule 23(b)(3). 
C.  The Fact That Individual Determinations of Damages Are 
Required Does Not Defeat Commonality 
Issue class certification under Rule 23(c)(4) is easily reconciled with 
the heightened commonality requirement established in Dukes. Dukes 
emphasized that the commonality inquiry should focus on the ability of a 
215. See id. at 222–25 for a more in-depth discussion behind the Advisory Committee 
proceedings and possible explanations for rejecting the narrower language. 
216. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 
442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979)). 
217. 445 U.S. 388 (1980). 
218. Id. at 402–03. 
219. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 592 (1997). 
220. Id. at 615 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note). 
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class-wide proceeding to produce common answers to fairly resolve the 
litigation.221 Rule 23 contains no suggestion that the fact that individual 
damage determinations are required destroys commonality. Rather, 
using Rule 23(c)(4) to identify a particular issue for class treatment at 
the outset restructures the case so that common issues are treated 
together, and individual issues are treated separately.222 
Rather than viewing issue class certification as an “end-run” around 
Rule 23’s requirements, some courts view issue class certification as a 
way to “avoid any actual or perceived conflict with Dukes.”223 By 
reframing the certification inquiry to focus only on the issues common to 
the class, Dukes’ heightened commonality requirement is more easily 
satisfied. For example, in Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. 
XTO Energy, Inc.,224 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the importance of 
using Rule 23(c)(4) and (c)(5) to “preserve the class action model in the 
face of individualized damages.”225 Citing Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in 
Comcast Corp., the court explained that district courts are “in the best 
position to evaluate the practical difficulties which inhere in the class 
action format” and are “especially suited to tailor the proceedings 
accordingly.”226 In other words, while the need for individualized money 
damages weighs against a finding that common issues predominate, 
district courts have wide latitude to sever common issues from 
individual issues to preserve the class action model. 
The Sixth Circuit recently issued one of the first appellate decisions to 
analyze Comcast Corp.’s impact on partial class certification, and 
concluded that the liberal application of Rule 23(c)(4) is still viable.227 In 
In re Whirlpool Corporation Front-Loading Washer Products Liability 
Litigation (Whirlpool II),228 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the certification of 
221. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
222. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, at 585–89. It has been noted that: 
Subdivision (c)(4) is particularly helpful in enabling courts to restructure complex cases to 
meet the other requirements for maintaining a class action . . . . The theory of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) 
is that the advantages and economies of adjudicating issues that are common to the entire class 
on a representative basis should be secured even though other issues in the case may have to be 
litigated separately by each class member. 
Id. 
223. In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practice Litig., MDL No. 1840, 2013 WL 1397125, at 
*18–19 (D. Kan. Apr. 5, 2013). 
224. No. 12-3176, 2013 WL 3389469 (10th Cir. July 9, 2013).  
225. Id. at *6.  
226. Id. 
227. Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 10-4188, 2013 WL 3746205, at *27 (6th Cir. July 18, 2013). 
228. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig. (Whirlpool I), 678 F.3d 409 
(6th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013), 
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a liability class for consumers who purchased specified Whirlpool 
washing machines that contained an alleged defect allowing mold and 
mildew to grow in the machines.229 Proof of damages was reserved for 
individual determination following the liability proceeding.230 The 
Supreme Court granted Whirlpool’s petition for certiorari, vacated the 
certification order, and remanded the case for consideration in light of 
Comcast Corp.231 On remand, the Sixth Circuit interpreted Amgen and 
Comcast Corp. to stand for the principle that “to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3), 
named plaintiffs must show, and district courts must find that questions 
of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over any 
questions that affect only individual members.”232 The court concluded 
that Comcast Corp. broke no new ground for the certification of a 
liability only class, and held that class certification was “the superior 
method to adjudicate [the] case fairly and efficiently.”233 
Whirlpool II highlights the need for a fact-specific inquiry to 
determine whether certification is appropriate, based on the particular 
substantive law involved. The court found that it was not improper to 
include in the class consumers whose washing machines had yet to 
display the defect, because “all Duet owners were injured at the point of 
sale upon paying a premium price for the Duets as designed.”234 
Additionally, the plaintiffs did not have to prove that mold manifested in 
every machine, because “the injury to all Duet owners occurred when 
Whirlpool failed to disclose the Duets’ propensity to develop biofilm 
and mold growth.”235 The court found that these contentions were 
common to the entire class and sufficient to warrant class treatment on 
the issue of liability.236 This approach supports the contention that using 
Rule 23(c)(4) to carve common issues for class treatment avoids a more 
exacting inquiry into the merits of the claim at the certification stage. 
remanded sub nom. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig. (Whirlpool II), 
No. 10-4188, 2013 WL 3746205 (6th Cir. July 18, 2013).  
229. Id. at *27.  
230. Id.  
231. Whirlpool Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1722. 
232. Whirlpool II, 2013 WL 3746205, at *27. 
233. Id. at *28.  
234. Id. at *21.  
235. Id. at *21–22. 
236. Id. at *22.  
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D.  Issue Class Certification Allows Litigants to Avoid Uncertainty 
Regarding Merits Inquiries, Heightened Commonality, and 
Incidental Monetary Relief Post-Dukes 
Another compelling argument for endorsing the expansive 
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4) is that by carving out common issues for 
class treatment, litigants can avoid difficult and uncertain areas of 
certification analysis that have emerged post-Dukes. McReynolds offers 
a prime example of how using Rule 23(c)(4) to single out common 
issues for class certification allows a large class to overcome Dukes’ 
heightened commonality analysis.237 By seeking certification only on the 
issue of injunctive relief pursuant to a Rule 23(b)(2) class, as the 
plaintiffs did in McReynolds, litigants can avoid answering tougher 
questions at the certification stage, such as how individual damages 
would be calculated.238 While Rule 23(c)(4) “should not be invoked 
merely to postpone difficult certification questions,”239 using this 
provision to reframe the certification analysis by focusing only on the 
common issues is a practical and permissible way to reframe complex 
consumer cases. 
An example of a case that may have come out differently had the 
litigants followed the McReynolds approach is Kottaras v. Whole Foods 
Market, Inc.240 In Kottaras, the court denied certification of a class of 
plaintiffs who alleged that a merger between Whole Foods Market and 
Wild Oats Market violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.241 Although 
the court found that Rule 23(a)(2) was easily satisfied, it ultimately 
denied certification because plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to 
prove that damages could be measured on a class-wide basis, which was 
necessary to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance inquiry.242 
The outcome reached in Kottaras was essentially the same as that 
reached in Comcast Corp., where the Court determined that certification 
was improper for a 23(b)(3) class on the ground that plaintiffs failed to 
show that damages could be measured on a class-wide basis.243 Under 
the McReynolds approach, however, the plaintiffs in Comcast Corp. 
237. See supra Section III.B.I and accompanying notes (discussing McReynolds).  
238. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012). 
239. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, at 588–89.  
240. 281 F.R.D. 16 (D.D.C. 2012). 
241. Id. at 18.  
242. Id.  
243. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1434 (2013). 
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could have used Rule 23(c)(4) to seek certification as a 23(b)(2) 
injunctive class, leaving individual damage determinations for a later 
inquiry. As one district court expressly noted, “Comcast does not 
foreclose a district court from certifying a liability only class under Rule 
23(c)(4).”244 This is not to say that a court will grant certification where 
it is clear that litigants are unable to prove that damages are measurable 
on a class-wide basis. However, as McReynolds illustrates, seeking 
injunctive relief or partial certification on the issue of liability allows 
litigants to avoid addressing individual issues at the certification stage.245 
Even after Comcast Corp., a district court allowed partial certification 
on the issue of liability, after acknowledging that individual damage 
determinations would be required.246 The court found that Rule 23(a)’s 
commonality requirement was satisfied because the case involved a 
uniform method of allegedly deceptive practices to sell motor fuel that 
affected all class members in the same way, which satisfied Dukes’ 
common contention requirement.247 The court found that common issues 
predominated, even though individual determinations of damages would 
eventually be required.248 The court balanced the efficiencies to be 
gained by deciding the issue of liability in a class proceeding with the 
burdens of individual trials, ultimately concluding that partial 
certification would advance the public goal of achieving a uniform 
resolution while also promoting judicial economy.249 
E.  Practitioners Should Proactively Use Rule 23(c)(4) to Frame 
Common Issues for Class Treatment 
Another unique aspect of Rule 23(c)(4) is the flexibility it provides to 
litigants and to the courts. While Rule 23(c)(1) requires courts to 
determine whether to certify a class “[a]s soon as practicable after the 
commencement of an action,”250 certification orders “may be 
conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the 
merits.”251 Early in the case, the advantages of issue class certification 
244. Wallace v. Powell, No. 3:09–cv–286, 2013 WL 2042369, at *19 (M.D. Pa. May 14, 2013).  
245. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 490 (7th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, __U.S__, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012). 
246. In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practice Litig., MDL No. 1840, 2013 WL 1397125, at 
*18–19 (D. Kan. Apr. 5, 2013). 
247. Id. at *18–19.  
248. Id. at *19. 
249. Id.  
250. FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).  
251. Id. 
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might not be apparent.252 Fortunately, “[t]he process of isolating the 
issues appropriate for representative treatment and dividing the class into 
suitable units may be undertaken at any time and the desirability of 
doing so should be re-evaluated throughout the litigation.”253 
Despite this flexibility, framing common issues for certification from 
the outset is a more advantageous strategy.254 By carving out only the 
common issues for class certification from the outset, litigants prevent 
the court from focusing on the weaknesses of the certification request. 
This approach was successful in McReynolds, where the plaintiffs made 
clear that they requested certification only on the issue of liability under 
a Rule 23(b)(2) class.255 As a result, the court was able to focus solely on 
whether the issue class satisfied Rule 23’s requirements. The class also 
provided sufficient information as to how the individual issues would be 
decided so that the court was satisfied that issue class certification would 
advance the efficiency of the litigation.256 
Courts have also invoked Rule 23(c)(4) sua sponte to ensure that 
earlier certification orders are in compliance with Dukes.257 In Easterling 
v. Connecticut Department of Correction,258 plaintiffs alleged that the 
Connecticut Department of Corrections’ physical fitness test had a 
disparate impact on female applicants.259 The court granted class 
certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) in January 2010.260 After Dukes, 
the defendant moved for decertification on the grounds that Dukes 
prohibits claims for individualized relief under Rule 23(b)(2).261 Rather 
than grant defendant’s motion, the court instead modified the earlier 
certification pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4). Thus, the Rule 23(b)(2) class was 
allowed to proceed on the issue of liability and injunctive relief, and a 
separate class was certified with regard to individualized monetary 
relief.262 While the court found that there were still several important 
252. See Romberg, supra note 1, at 268. 
253. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, at 588. 
254. See Romberg, supra note 1, at 268. 
255. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012). 
256. Id. at 492.  
257. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2012 WL 205875, 
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), adopted in part by & rev’d in part by, 877 F. Supp. 2d 133 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); Easterling v. Conn. Dep’t of Correction, 278 F.R.D. 41, 45 (D. Conn. 2011). 
258. Easterling, 278 F.R.D. 41. 
259. Id. at 44. 
260. Id. at 43. 
261. Id.  
262. Id. at 51. 
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individual questions to be addressed in the 23(b)(3) damages class, the 
court ultimately concluded that these questions were “less substantial” 
than the questions that would be “subject to generalized proof” in the 
class proceeding.263 
As the next part of this Comment discusses, this approach is not 
without drawbacks and is not appropriate in every situation. Certain 
types of issues are better suited for issue certification than others, and 
determining the limits of issue certification is a largely unsettled and 
important area of discussion. 
VI.  RULE 23(C)(4) IS NOT APPROPRIATE IN EVERY 
CIRCUMSTANCE AND REQUIRES A FACT-SPECIFIC 
INQUIRY 
Rule 23(c)(4) is a discretionary tool, and like other certification 
determinations made under Rule 23, a court’s decision to bifurcate 
should “be supported by rigorous analysis.”264 Determining the propriety 
of bifurcation under subsection (c)(4) requires a fact-specific inquiry 
into the prevalence and type of individual issues present in a given 
case.265 Even courts that have generally approved the use of issue 
certification have declined to certify issue classes in certain 
circumstances.266 For example, issue certification is not appropriate 
where the predominance of individual issues prevents limited class 
certification from increasing the efficiency of the litigation.267 This is 
particularly problematic in cases where issues of individual reliance, 
injury, and damages are intertwined with the issue of liability.268 
Additionally, the Seventh Amendment, choice-of-law concerns, and the 
specific elements of a cause of action are important factors that must be 
considered when deciding whether to certify an issue class. 
263. Id. at 50.  
264. Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 272 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Hohider v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 200–01 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
265. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1601 (noting that although recent case law indicates that issue 
classes are falling out of favor with the courts, recent appellate decisions declining to certify issue 
classes reflect case-specific concerns rather than opposition to the availability of issue class 
certification). 
266. See, e.g., In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 522 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 2008) (denying certification 
on issue of liability because individual damage trials would still be required to determine causation, 
damages, and applicable defenses). 
267. See McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying issue 
certification where larger issues such as reliance, injury and damages would remain for each 
individual plaintiff, thus certification would not materially advance the litigation). 
268. Id.  
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A.  Seventh Amendment Re-examination Clause May Preclude the 
Availability of Issue Class Certification 
One of the biggest challenges imposed by the use of issue classes is 
that in some instances, bifurcation of issues may produce constitutional 
problems stemming from the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination 
Clause.269 In cases where the issues receiving class treatment overlap 
conceptually with issues to be tried in later proceedings, the Seventh 
Amendment prevents issues decided by a jury in the first proceeding 
from being reexamined in subsequent proceedings.270 While this is 
certainly an important concern and does preclude issue class certification 
in some circumstances, the Reexamination Clause is not implicated in 
every type of bifurcated proceeding. For example, where the issue of 
liability is wholly distinct from the determination of damages, the jury in 
the latter proceeding would not be required to reexamine the findings of 
the earlier jury. In many types of product liability and mass tort cases, 
however, issues of proximate cause, negligence, and damages are so 
closely intertwined that the Reexamination Clause poses an 
insurmountable barrier.271 
B.  Choice-of-Law Concerns Arise Where Class Includes Plaintiffs 
from Different States 
Choice-of-law concerns are another important impediment faced by 
class actions in diversity actions involving class representatives from 
multiple states.272 In some cases, multiple state laws could apply to a 
single class. If the state laws at issue are uniform, choice-of-law 
concerns are inconsequential. However, where the discrepancies in state 
laws are material and the class has not agreed on which state’s law 
269. The Reexamination Clause provides that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. VII. Although this provision only applies to matters where the Seventh Amendment 
requires a jury trial, this category is far reaching and includes most class actions. It includes all 
“actions for damages to a person or property, for libel and slander, for recovery of land, and for 
conversion of personal property,” Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970), as well as “actions 
enforcing statutory rights . . . if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action 
for damages in the ordinary courts of law,” Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974). 
270. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1602; see also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 
1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995) (declining certification where issues of negligence and proximate cause 
were so closely intertwined that they would violate the Seventh amendment’s reexamination 
clause). 
271. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1303. 
272. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1603. 
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should be applied, certification is not appropriate.273 Recently, a district 
court denied certification in a breach of warranty claim where the 
plaintiffs failed to set forth which state’s law would govern the class, 
and did not establish the elements of a claim for breach of express 
warranty in that jurisdiction.274 Without this information, it was 
impossible for the court to determine “if the answers to the proposed 
questions would resolve an issue central to the validity of the express 
warranty claim.”275 This decision highlights that Rule 23(c)(4) cannot 
salvage claims that do not allege common issues that are capable of 
class-wide resolution. 
The use of state subclasses under Rule 23(c)(5) is one possible way to 
address choice-of-law concerns.276 As one commentator noted, “[s]tate 
subclasses used in conjunction with the issue class might solve this 
problem and salvage certification for certain parts of litigation, but 
subclassing alone will not always be enough, as plaintiffs may have 
factual differences that additionally require subclass lines to be 
drawn.”277 Particularly where the nuances in state law are minor, and the 
use of subclasses and issue classes promotes judicial economy, choice-
of-law issues do not pose an insurmountable barrier to issue class 
certification. 
C.  The Type of Substantive Law Involved Factors Heavily into 
Whether Issue Class Certification Is Appropriate 
Another consideration when determining whether issue class 
certification is appropriate is the substantive law involved. While 
commentators frequently opine that liability is an issue that is well suited 
to issue class certification,278 the resolution of the issue of liability often 
involves multiple stages and elements of law. Although the elements of a 
claim differ depending on the relevant cause of action, some elements of 
liability are inextricably intertwined with individual issues and may not 
be appropriate for class treatment. Elements that involve the defendant’s 
conduct specifically are more likely to achieve certification, because 
273. See Cochran v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC, No. 1:11-CV-927, 2013 WL 1729103, at *2 
(M.D.N.C. Apr. 22, 2013).  
274. Id.  
275. Id.  
276. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1603. 
277. Id.  
278. Id. 
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these elements are generally common to the entire class.279 In the 
products liability context, courts are hesitant to grant partial certification 
on liability because elements of liability may overlap with individual 
issues, such as reliance, injury, and damages.280 While courts have not 
explicitly ruled out the possibility of granting issue class certification in 
products liability cases, most often, the overlap of individual issues 
prevents courts from finding that common issues “predominate.”281 
Consumer and securities fraud are two areas that are generally well 
suited for issue class certification.282 In these cases, the defendant’s 
allegedly deceptive practice is generally common to the class and 
relatively easy to separate from the remaining individual issues. Pella 
Corp. v. Saltzman283 is a prime example of how Rule 23(c)(4) and Rule 
23(c)(5) can be used together to separate common issues for certification 
in the consumer fraud context.284 In Pella, all of the consumers in the 
putative class purchased the same defective windows; however, some 
consumers had yet to experience any economic harm from the defect at 
the time the class sought certification.285 The Seventh Circuit allowed 
for certification of a 23(b)(2) class on the issue of liability, which was an 
issue common to all consumers.286 The plaintiffs also invoked Rule 
23(c)(5) to create subclasses to distinguish those plaintiffs who had 
already incurred economic harm from those who had yet to incur any 
damages287 and to avoid difficult choice-of law issues that arise for 
plaintiffs from different states.288 Consistent with the approach the 
Seventh Circuit has taken when applying Rule 23(c)(4) in previous 
cases, the court found that the benefits of judicial economy and 
achieving a uniform disposition on the issue of liability outweighed any 
279. Id. at 1605. 
280. Id. at 1609–10. 
281. See McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co, 522 F.3d 215, 222, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying 
certification after recognizing that issue class might be appropriate to address whether the 
defendants had a scheme to defraud, because issues of reliance, injury, and damages predominated 
for each individual plaintiff and partial class treatment would not materially advance the litigation).  
282. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, at 235–37 (“[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons 
by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, and it may 
remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate determination of the damages suffered 
by individuals within the class.”). 
283. 606 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2010). 
284. See id. at 392. 
285. Id. at 393. 
286. Id. at 396. 
287. Id. at 392. 
288. Id. at 396. 
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potential concerns surrounding individual issues.289 
CONCLUSION 
Categorical rules for issue class certification are difficult to formulate 
and would undoubtedly lead to either the overuse, or underuse, of Rule 
23(c)(4). The lack of clear judicial guidance on when to use Rule 
23(c)(4), however, has led to divergent interpretations of the rule and 
significant uncertainty for litigants. This Comment highlights the 
importance of achieving a more uniform interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4), 
and argues that courts should follow the approach used in the majority of 
federal circuits. Furthermore, courts should use the ALI factors to help 
guide their analysis to ensure that Rule 23(c)(4) is used appropriately, to 
achieve its intended purpose of promoting judicial economy and 
improving the manageability of complex litigation. 
As this Comment illustrates, the law surrounding consumer class 
actions is greatly unsettled. The use of issue classes to “carve at the 
joints,”290 “treat common things in common,”291 and break up complex 
litigation into more manageable pieces is consistent with recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence and faithful to the purposes Rule 23 was designed to 
promote. 
 
 
289. Id.  
290. Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 2003). 
291. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 35 (5th Cir. 1968). 
 
                                                     
